The completion of the United States military withdrawal from Iraq is changing the balance of power inside a country where Washington and Tehran have spent years competing for influence. The final American forces are leaving after more than two decades of military involvement, following the 2024 agreement between Baghdad and Washington to wind down the US-led coalition mission. The significance of the departure, however, extends beyond the end of an American military operation. Iran already has extensive political and security influence in Iraq through allied armed groups, several of which are formally incorporated into the country’s security structure while retaining considerable independence.

Iraqi security analysts cited in recent reporting argue that the American departure removes a military presence that had acted as a counterweight to Tehran and could allow Iran-aligned groups to seek greater influence over security and political decision-making. That does not mean the withdrawal automatically transfers control of Iraq to Iran or its allies. Rather, it changes the environment in which those groups operate by removing one of the most significant external forces capable of constraining their ambitions. The question is therefore less whether Iran will suddenly gain influence and more whether the disappearance of the American military counterweight allows influence that already exists to become more deeply embedded in Iraq’s institutions.

The timing makes that question particularly consequential. Iraq has maintained an unusual relationship with both Washington and Tehran, despite their longstanding confrontation. The United States invaded Iraq in 2003, withdrew its forces in 2011 and returned in 2014 after the Islamic State seized large areas of the country. The later US-led campaign helped Iraqi forces defeat the group’s territorial caliphate, while Iran-backed militias also played a significant role in fighting the organisation. Over time, however, the armed groups that had helped defeat Islamic State developed into powerful political and security actors in their own right.

Many became part of the Popular Mobilization Forces, which are formally incorporated into Iraq’s security apparatus, while some of the most powerful factions have maintained their own chains of command and close ties to Tehran. This history makes the current withdrawal different from a simple transfer of responsibility from foreign forces to an entirely independent Iraqi security system. Baghdad is assuming greater responsibility at a moment when some armed groups possess both institutional access and political influence. The result is a potentially more complicated balance between the authority of the Iraqi state and the power of organisations that operate within, alongside and sometimes beyond that state structure.

The US Departure Removes a Counterweight to Iranian Influence

The most important consequence of the withdrawal for Iran is not that Tehran suddenly acquires influence in Iraq. Iran already possesses substantial leverage through political relationships and armed groups that have operated in Iraq for years. The change is that an important military counterweight is disappearing. An Iraqi security analyst quoted by Reuters argued that Iran benefits strategically because the coalition’s departure removes an American presence that had constrained Tehran’s influence. The same analyst predicted that pro-Iranian militias would attempt to turn the withdrawal into greater influence over security and political decision-making.

That assessment provides the basis for a broader interpretation of the withdrawal: when a powerful external actor leaves a contested political environment, existing actors with established networks can gain additional room to pursue their interests. In Iraq’s case, Iran-aligned groups do not have to build influence from scratch. They already possess political connections, armed capabilities and institutional positions. Their challenge has been to reconcile those sources of power with the authority of the Iraqi state and the presence of competing foreign powers. The disappearance of American troops may therefore reduce one of the constraints on their ability to negotiate, pressure or compete for greater influence.

The unresolved question of militia disarmament makes this shift even more important. Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi had linked the September 30 deadline to efforts to bring powerful armed groups under greater state control, but several of the strongest Iran-aligned factions have resisted surrendering their weapons. Reuters reported earlier in September that the government faced significant obstacles in persuading the most powerful groups to disarm. Some militias are already officially part of the Popular Mobilization Forces, complicating the distinction between state security institutions and independent armed organisations.

The government’s stated objective has included bringing weapons and armed factions more firmly under central command, but the most influential groups have rejected the idea of simply giving up their weapons. This creates a structural problem for Baghdad. The US departure reduces foreign military involvement at exactly the moment when the Iraqi government is attempting to consolidate the state’s exclusive authority over armed force. If the government cannot fully impose that authority, the withdrawal could leave Iran-aligned factions with greater freedom to negotiate from a position of strength. The consequence would not necessarily be immediate instability, but a potentially stronger bargaining position for groups that already possess considerable political and military resources.

Iraq’s Sovereignty Comes With a Harder Security Test

For Baghdad, the withdrawal carries an important political benefit because ending the foreign military presence fulfils a longstanding demand for greater national sovereignty. The American military presence has been controversial inside Iraq, particularly among groups that regard foreign forces as an infringement on national independence. Iran-backed factions have explicitly celebrated the departure as a victory for what they call the Iraqi resistance. The Iraqi government can therefore present the end of the US mission as evidence that national institutions are assuming responsibility for the country’s security. But sovereignty and security capacity are not necessarily the same thing.

Removing foreign troops gives Baghdad greater formal responsibility; it does not automatically strengthen the institutions needed to exercise that responsibility. The challenge is particularly acute because the state must manage competing armed groups while maintaining control over a security environment that has been shaped for years by both US and Iranian involvement. The withdrawal therefore creates an opportunity for Iraq to assert greater independence, but it also places greater pressure on the government to demonstrate that sovereignty can be exercised through national institutions rather than through competing armed factions.

This is why the debate over the withdrawal cannot be reduced to whether Americans should remain in Iraq. The more consequential question is what fills the strategic space created when they leave. If Iraqi state institutions successfully consolidate control over armed groups, the departure could strengthen Baghdad’s ability to operate independently of both Washington and Tehran. If that process remains incomplete, powerful militias may have greater opportunities to convert their existing military and political strength into additional influence.

Iraqi security experts have already warned that the country may not be fully prepared to assume the entire security burden, while others argue that continued foreign forces are themselves an obstacle to genuine sovereignty. Those competing positions reveal the central tension created by the withdrawal. The American presence was a source of military support but also a source of political friction; its removal reduces one problem while potentially exposing another. The outcome will depend less on the physical absence of American troops than on whether Iraqi institutions can prevent armed groups from becoming the principal beneficiaries of the changed balance.

Islamic State Adds Another Layer of Risk

The potential expansion of Iran-backed militia influence is not the only security concern created by the American departure. Iraqi officials and Kurdish commanders have also warned that Islamic State sleeper cells could exploit the reduction in American intelligence, surveillance and logistical support. The group lost its territorial control in Iraq years ago, but it has retained clandestine networks capable of carrying out attacks. Reuters reported that Kurdish officials had observed increased movement by suspected sleeper cells after the withdrawal became imminent, while Iraqi security forces said they had disrupted a suspected plot involving suicide attacks timed around the departure. These developments do not demonstrate that Islamic State is returning to its former strength.

The organisation no longer controls the vast territory it once held, and Iraqi security forces have considerably more experience confronting it. But the loss of some American intelligence and operational support could make counterterrorism work more difficult, particularly in areas where security responsibilities are divided between Baghdad and the Kurdish authorities. The risk is therefore not necessarily a repeat of the Islamic State expansion of 2014, but a deterioration in the ability to detect and contain a weakened organisation before it can exploit gaps in security.

The simultaneous risks involving Iran-aligned militias and Islamic State illustrate why the consequences of the US withdrawal are more complicated than a simple shift in influence from Washington to Tehran. Iran-backed groups could gain greater political and security room because the American counterweight is disappearing, while Islamic State could attempt to exploit weaknesses in intelligence and security coordination. These are very different threats, but both place greater demands on the Iraqi state. Baghdad must prevent powerful militias from operating independently of central authority while also ensuring that the reduction in international counterterrorism support does not create opportunities for extremist networks.

That makes the post-withdrawal period a test of Iraq’s institutional capacity rather than simply a test of military strength. The central issue is whether the Iraqi government can translate formal sovereignty into effective control over security. If it succeeds, the withdrawal could mark a genuine transition toward greater Iraqi autonomy. If it struggles, the vacuum left by the American military presence may be filled not by a stronger Iraqi state alone, but by a more complicated competition among Iran-aligned militias, political factions and remnants of Islamic State.

(Adapted from TheConversation.com)

Categories: Geopolitics, Strategy