The approaching expiration of the last remaining bilateral arms control framework between the United States and Russia is not merely a procedural deadline. It reflects a deeper structural shift in how the two nuclear superpowers perceive deterrence, strategic stability, and each other’s long-term intentions. Unless a late intervention freezes existing limits, Washington and Moscow are poised to enter a period without formal constraints on their strategic arsenals for the first time in more than half a century. The risk is not an immediate surge in deployed warheads, but the gradual normalization of worst-case planning that historically fuels arms races.

At the center of this moment is the unraveling of assumptions that underpinned post–Cold War arms control: that transparency reduces miscalculation, that parity can be stabilized through negotiated ceilings, and that economic and political incentives favor restraint. Those assumptions are now under pressure from technological change, geopolitical rivalry, and eroding trust.

How arms control became the backbone of strategic stability

Since the early 1970s, nuclear arms treaties between Washington and Moscow have functioned less as instruments of disarmament than as tools of predictability. Beginning with agreements negotiated during the presidencies of Richard Nixon and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev, the two sides accepted that unconstrained competition was both dangerous and economically corrosive.

These accords capped warhead numbers, restricted delivery systems, and—crucially—embedded verification regimes. Inspections, data exchanges, and notification requirements created a shared factual baseline, allowing each side to interpret the other’s actions with fewer assumptions about hidden intent. Over decades, this architecture survived ideological hostility, proxy wars, and domestic political change because it served a narrow but vital purpose: preventing catastrophic misjudgment.

The current treaty, New START, continued that logic into the 21st century. Its value has always lain less in the precise numerical limits than in its ability to structure expectations. Once those limits disappear, the stabilizing function of arms control does not vanish overnight, but it weakens rapidly.

Why the treaty framework is breaking down now

The erosion of the arms control regime is not the result of a single decision, but of accumulated strategic divergence. Moscow and Washington increasingly disagree on what should be regulated, what counts as destabilizing, and which technologies belong inside treaty frameworks.

Russia has invested heavily in novel nuclear delivery systems designed to evade missile defenses or exploit gaps in existing agreements. These include nuclear-powered cruise missiles, hypersonic glide vehicles, and underwater systems with strategic reach. From Moscow’s perspective, these developments compensate for perceived vulnerabilities created by U.S. missile defense programs and conventional precision strike capabilities.

The United States, meanwhile, has expanded its focus beyond traditional bilateral parity. Policymakers increasingly frame deterrence in global rather than dyadic terms, emphasizing the rise of China as a third nuclear power not bound by U.S.–Russia agreements. This shift complicates negotiations: any new treaty that ignores China is seen by some in Washington as strategically incomplete, while Beijing rejects participation in frameworks built around arsenals far larger than its own.

Against this backdrop, extending or replacing New START has become entangled with broader disputes over technology, trust, and geopolitical alignment.

The strategic logic behind U.S. hesitation

From Washington’s standpoint, allowing treaty limits to lapse creates optionality rather than immediate escalation. The United States retains a reserve of non-deployed warheads and delivery systems that could be reactivated without new production. Supporters of this flexibility argue that it strengthens deterrence in a world where the U.S. may face two nuclear-armed rivals simultaneously.

There is also skepticism about compliance. Russia’s suspension of inspections under New START, justified by Moscow as a response to wider political tensions, undermined confidence in the treaty’s verification mechanisms. For critics, accepting a short-term extension without restored inspections risks legitimizing a framework that exists on paper but not in practice.

This logic aligns with a broader strategic reassessment that prioritizes adaptability over arms control permanence. In this view, treaties should follow power realities, not constrain them artificially.

Russia’s calculation and the case for temporary restraint

Moscow’s position reflects a different set of incentives. Russia has signaled willingness to observe existing limits temporarily, framing restraint as a stabilizing measure rather than a concession. This stance serves multiple purposes: it reinforces Russia’s self-image as a responsible nuclear power, preserves parity at a time of economic strain, and places the onus for escalation on Washington if limits collapse.

At the same time, Russian officials have been explicit that the absence of a treaty would free them to respond symmetrically to any U.S. expansion. The message is calibrated: restraint is possible, but only if mutual and temporary. Beyond that, Russia is prepared to adjust its force posture in ways that would be difficult to reverse.

This posture reflects a long-standing Russian concern that arms control should limit U.S. advantages rather than constrain Russia alone. Without a framework that addresses missile defense and emerging technologies, Moscow sees little incentive to accept permanent ceilings.

How a new arms race would actually unfold

A post-treaty environment would not resemble the rapid numerical buildups of the Cold War. Instead, escalation would likely be incremental and opaque. Both sides would begin by “uploading” additional warheads onto existing missiles, followed by adjustments in deployment patterns and alert levels.

The most destabilizing element would be uncertainty. Without inspections and data exchanges, planners would assume worst-case scenarios, leading to force structures designed for redundancy rather than sufficiency. Over time, this dynamic encourages overinvestment and increases the risk that routine military movements are misinterpreted as preparations for conflict.

Economic costs would also accumulate. Nuclear modernization programs are already among the most expensive long-term defense commitments. An unconstrained environment would amplify those costs, diverting resources without necessarily improving security.

The China factor and strategic triangulation

China’s expanding nuclear arsenal adds a third dimension to what was once a bilateral equation. While still smaller than those of the United States and Russia, China’s force is becoming more sophisticated and survivable. This trend reinforces U.S. arguments that legacy treaties no longer reflect strategic reality.

Yet China’s position complicates rather than resolves the dilemma. Beijing resists joining arms control talks that assume numerical parity, while Washington is reluctant to bind itself without Chinese participation. The result is a stalemate in which the absence of agreement accelerates the very multipolar competition policymakers seek to manage.

The possibility of a last-minute understanding to maintain existing limits would not restore the arms control order of the past. At best, it would buy time—time to debate how deterrence functions in a world of hypersonic weapons, missile defenses, cyber interference, and multiple nuclear powers.

Absent such a pause, the United States and Russia will drift into a strategic environment defined less by rules than by assumptions. History suggests that such environments do not produce immediate catastrophe, but they do erode the margins for error. In nuclear strategy, shrinking those margins has always been the prelude to instability rather than its cure.

(Adapted from TheStandard.com.hk)

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