Reports that U.S. President Donald Trump pressed European Union officials to impose punitive tariffs — as high as 100% — on imports from China and India have set off urgent debate in Brussels and capitals across Asia and Europe. The proposal, conveyed in private talks and reported by multiple news outlets citing anonymous U.S. and EU sources, is part of a broader U.S. push to squeeze Moscow by choking off key buyers of Russian oil. The account of the call is based on source information and has not been issued as an official White House or EU communique.

Why Trump is urging extreme tariffs as pressure on Putin

Analysts say Mr. Trump’s pitch to European counterparts reflects a blunt geopolitical calculation: if China and India curb purchases of Russian hydrocarbons, Moscow’s state revenues and its ability to finance the war in Ukraine would be sharply diminished. From Washington’s point of view, tariffs are not merely trade tools but strategic levers — punitive and symmetric — that can be turned quickly and dramatically to reshape trading incentives. Supporters of the idea argue tariffs could be used as a blunt instrument to change behaviour where diplomacy and sanctions alone have so far fallen short.

Critics see several problems with that logic. Tariffs of the magnitude reportedly suggested would reverberate through global supply chains, hit European manufacturers reliant on Asian inputs, and risk retaliation that would amplify economic pain across economies still healing from years of pandemic and post-pandemic dislocation. They would also convert a sanctions campaign, which targets specific actors and transactions, into a wholesale trade war that treats entire economies as adversaries — a step that would raise legal, economic and political complications for the EU and its member states.

What is holding the EU back — energy ties, politics and charges of hypocrisy

Several obstacles explain why the EU has not embraced Washington’s tariff prescription. First is raw economic self-interest and the residual energy relationship with Russia. While the bloc has dramatically reduced its reliance on Russian oil and gas since 2022, significant divergences remain across member states: some nations have already moved far from Russian supplies, others remain exposed because of long-term contracts, pipeline dependencies and affordability concerns. That energy reality constrains the political appetite for sweeping, unconditional measures that could ricochet domestically.

Second is legal and institutional caution. The EU typically prefers calibrated sanctions underpinned by legal frameworks and co-ordinated with allies rather than immediate, blanket tariffs that could contravene World Trade Organization rules or trigger wide-ranging countermeasures. Brussels has argued that targeted measures, a price cap on Russian oil and export controls on dual-use technology are more sustainable levers than sweeping tariff walls.

Third — and politically sensitive — is the charge of hypocrisy that critics level at Western capitals for publicly calling on others to curtail trade with Russia while still buying energy and commodities from Moscow at historically significant levels. Even after large percentage reductions, some EU countries continue to import Russian gas and oil under contracts negotiated before 2022, and those purchases have become a stick with which opponents of tougher measures beat Brussels. That accusation — politically potent in New Delhi and Beijing — complicates the EU’s diplomatic posture: it must weigh the geopolitical logic of greater pressure on Moscow against domestic energy security, industrial competitiveness and credibility in global forums.

Trade politics and the year-end deal: ambitions, contradictions and timing

Complicating the immediate calculus is a parallel diplomatic track in which the EU is racing to secure trade agreements that would stabilise markets and shore up political support at home. Officials have been working intensively to close gaps in major negotiations — notably with India — with an eye to concluding deals by the end of the year. For Brussels, trade pacts are a way to lock in diversified supply chains, defuse political pressure from industry, and project strategic autonomy in an era of mounting geopolitical pressure. That timetable, however, runs up against the disruptive potential of imposing broad tariffs on two of the world’s largest economies.

EU diplomats argue that a negotiated approach — combining stronger sanctions against Russian military-relevant sectors, a faster phase-out of new Russian energy contracts, and accelerated diversification of energy suppliers — better aligns with legal norms and economic resilience than an ad hoc tariff barrage. Yet the political theatre of a high-stakes phone call in Washington, amplified by press reports, puts Brussels in a difficult position: adopt a tougher line to satisfy allied pressure, or insist on calibrated measures and risk accusations of foot-dragging from the White House.

Observers say the clash reveals broader strategic divergences: the United States, at least in the form reported, is signalling a willingness to weaponise trade more aggressively and quickly; the EU, by contrast, is balancing strategic goals with a still-fragile energy transition and the need to protect an integrated single market.

Market and diplomatic fallout to watch

Markets and diplomats will watch several metrics closely. Will the EU accelerate legal proposals to phase out Russian oil and gas earlier than the current 2028 target? Will Brussels and member states step up a co-ordinated procurement of alternative energy supplies to wean sensitive economies off Russian contracts? And will India and China respond to pressure with either concessions on Russian purchases or counter-measures that further polarise trade politics?

Another immediate test is messaging: EU officials must calibrate a response that defends the bloc’s economic interests, pushes for continued isolation of Russia where possible, and preserves the prospect of concluding trade deals with partners such as India by year-end. In parallel, commentators note that the story’s provenance — based on anonymous sources rather than an official White House release — means the tactic may be exploratory, aimed at gauging reactions rather than the statement of a fixed policy. That caveat will shape both Brussels’ manoeuvres and how New Delhi and Beijing publicly reply.

For now, the episode underscores a growing tension in transatlantic strategy: whether to treat trade policy primarily as a tool of geopolitical coercion, deployed swiftly to alter behaviour, or to use trade and sanctions as instruments that must be calibrated to preserve economic resilience, legal norms and long-term diplomatic leverage. How the EU answers that question in the coming weeks — and whether it can reconcile domestic energy realities with the urgency of constraining Russian revenue streams — will determine whether the Trump proposal remains a provocative media note or triggers a genuine reordering of global trade policy.

(Adapted from AlJazeera.com)

Categories: Economy & Finance, Geopolitics, Regulations & Legal, Strategy